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In late May 2024, the network broke the news that Belarus would be creating its own media platform. It's a YouTube analogue, but only for the media controlled by Lukashenko's regime. Irina Akulovich, Director General of the propaganda agency BelTA, stated this on air on the TV channel Belarus 1. She stated that the order to create the media platform came directly from Lukashenko. At the end of 2023, the Cyberpartisans infiltrated the internal network of the BelTA. This gave us access to internal documents that shed light on the first stages of the project. How propagandists will find a way to bypass the blocking of their videos for inaccurate information and propaganda of violence? How much is the Lukashenko regime willing to spend on this? What well-known IT companies negotiated about the development of the portal for propaganda? Are they preparing to block Youtube in Belarus and what to do if this threat becomes a reality? Read the article or watch the video at the link below. Why Does the Dictator Need His Own YouTube? On Lukashenko's order, BelTA news agency engaged in the project of the Belarusian video service from the beginning of 2023. It will initially feature content from the republican TV channels, Sovetskaya Belorussia and BelTA itself. Then engage the regional media supporting the dictator. You see an internal document that describes the concept of creating such an Internet resource. Its authors argue that the publication of video content on YouTube makes the state-owned Belarusian media segment vulnerable. Materials of the dictatorship-controlled media are regularly blocked and deleted on international Internet resources. Therefore, it is necessary to create your own resource where materials are stored permanently and always available. Over the last few years, YouTube and Facebook have blocked many channels and accounts that openly support the Putin and Lukashenko regimes. Thus, in the 21st year, YouTube blocked the video with the speech of the Belarusian dictator on Victory Square on 9 May. In the 22nd year, the so-called channel of the Union State 'BelRos', which received warnings from the administration for spreading false information and propaganda of violence, was blocked. Of course, on the dictator's own media portal, there will be no such moderation. According to the developed concept, what and when to publish is decided by BelTA employees themselves, while the representatives of TV channels have to coordinate their plans with them. How Many Viewers Does Propaganda Expect? As for the popularity of the portal, which will host all the main state media, in the first year, they expect a maximum of 3 000 simultaneous visitors. And in the second year, they expect no more than 20 000 simultaneous connections and up to 50 000 during socially significant events. As we learned from the working correspondence of BelTA employees, in the first stages of the project discussion, the name of the state-owned video hosting was proposed in Belarusian. However, according to BelTA Director General Irina Akulovich, it has a bad effect on search queries. Perhaps that's why they agreed on the working name ‘Video.bel’. Which IT Companies in Belta Considered Entrusting the Development of Video Hosting? To implement the technical part of the project, it was planned to attract one of the provider companies, which should provide its infrastructure and basic software, and then deal with the maintenance and security of video hosting. To find such a provider, in the second half of the 23rd year, BelTA employees began to send requests to many relevant organisations in Belarus and Russia. Thus, the companies Softec Lab’, ‘Telebreeze’, ‘Ontide Soft’, and ‘Studio Infolio’ were particularly interested in the project. Their representatives sent commercial proposals for the implementation of the media service based on their capabilities. At the same time, BelTA management actively negotiated cooperation on the project with two companies: InDev Solutions OJSC and A1 provider . On the screen, you can see the roadmap for August 2023, developed by InDev Solutions team, which outlines BelTA's work with these two organisations in stages. The full document: ‘InDev Solutions' is an IT Company under the Control of the OAC 'InDev Solutions' was only recently registered in December 2022. However, in the first few months after its launch, it started cooperating with the country's leading universities and the Ministry of Health, as well as becoming a resident of the High Technology Park. The explanation for such rapid success and high trust of the state authorities is not difficult to find. The director of InDev Solutions is Oleg Belyakov, a former employee of the Operational and Analytical Centre, abbreviated as OAC. He is also a member of the working group for the formation and implementation of the State Programme ‘Digital Development of Belarus’ as a representative of the OAC. Moreover, according to the legal address on the InDev Solutions website, the company is located in the same building as the ‘National Traffic Exchange Centre’ under the management of the OAC. Sergey Sudakov, a former employee of the OAC, holds the position of Deputy Director General for Information Technologies at InDev Solutions. The company's leading legal adviser is Yulia Brizinskaya, who also has a decent track record. Previously, Brizinskaya worked in the Interior Ministry, KGB, as a legal adviser to the military information agency ‘Vayar’ of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, as well as in the OAC-affiliated company BeCloud. By the way, since late 2023, Becloud owns a controlling stake in InDev Solutions. So the company in fact is managed by the OAC. Negotiations with A1 The roadmap for the development of video hosting for the republican TV channels also includes the Belarusian subsidiary of the Austrian provider A1. According to the working correspondence of BelTA employees, negotiations on the joint implementation of the project have been held since the early summer of 2023. Namely with the deputy director general for digital platforms and content of A1 Anton Bladik (he has now resigned from this position), who, by the way, previously worked as a chief specialist in the state military-industrial committee of the Republic of Belarus. According to an internal BelTA document, which you can see on the screen, specific costs and plans were even discussed. Thus, the launch and maintenance of the video hosting for a year was estimated by the representatives of ‘A1’ at 600-700 thousand US dollars, if we take a ready-made solution based on the software ‘Voka’. The full document: However, the costs were already significantly adjusted upwards after a month of discussions. BelTA employees estimated the amount needed to launch and operate the media platform in the first year at about $1.5-2 million, and the annual costs starting from the second year of operation at about $1 million. You can see below one of the variants of such calculation. The full document: At that time, in November 2023, negotiations with A1 on the development of a Belarusian video service were so close that they directly discussed bypassing open tender procedures. You can see below a retelling of the negotiations with A1 in the working chat of BelTA employees. According to this message, both sides are dissatisfied with the fact that any participant can formally win the open tender and get the state order. The representatives of A1 offered their options to bypass these procedures. Judging by the data from the site of public procurement, in February and March 2024 BelTA attempted to hold open tenders for video broadcasting services. Based on the data on the same portal, it is not difficult to establish that the company ‘A1’ participated in tenders. The well-known provider was competing with Mediatek Ltd, whose bid was rejected by the procurement commission. Since this summer BelTA Director General Irina Akulovich confidently promised that the state video portal would start working at the end of August, we can assume that the contractor for the project has been found after all. Are They Preparing to Switch off Youtube in Belarus? At this time, we are not aware of any documents or plans that would support this. But we cannot completely deny this possibility. Belarusians have already faced problems with loading the service on New Year's Eve. We would like to remind you that at that time Youtube did not load for 20 minutes in Belarus. The easiest way to fight such restrictions is to use VPN services. Among other things, modern technologies allow you to bypass even the blocking of VPNs themselves. According to our assessment, the development of a separate video resource for Lukashenka's propagandists is mainly aimed at avoiding blocking of their content. But whether Belarusians will use such a site en masse is doubtful. Write in the comments on our channel what you think about it. Subscribe to our channel in Telegram, where we publish other investigations on the data obtained from the internal networks of the regime.

P-Telegram from Cyberpartisan has advantages over the original Telegram, thanks to which it will come in handy NOT only in countries with dictatorships and military conflicts. We've gathered in one post some of the main features that make Partisan Telegram worth using even in a democratic world.

The political repression within the walls of the country's leading university - Belarusian State University (BSU) - which has been going on for several years, provoked an attack by Cyberpartisans on its internal network. More than 3 terabytes of data have come into our possession: documents, correspondence, and audio recordings that shed light on the real situation at the university. The first part of the investigation, in which we revealed the background of repression in BSU and published real statistics of dismissals and expulsions for political reasons, is shown here. Now we will clearly show on the example of the Belarusian State University what the system of higher education in Belarus has turned into under dictator Lukashenko, as well as reveal some secrets of the university management, which have been carefully hidden so far. Rector Korol: surveillance and repression at BSU Total surveillance of students and teachers by special services, constant intrigues and manipulations have become the norm in the BSU leadership, de facto appointed by Lukashenko's administration not for personal or academic merit, but on the principle of loyalty to the system. Thus, since 2017 Andrei Korol has been rector of BSU. After the rigged 2020 elections, the BSU rector openly demonstrated his commitment to the dictatorship. In September of that year, Andrey Korol issued an official statement in which he promised that there would be no dismissals and expulsions for political reasons at the Belarusian State University. However, since then hundreds of teachers and students have left the university because of repressions. Three-room Apartment In Minsk For Political Purges In the University Andrey Korol, who felt he had shown enough loyalty to the regime, decided to ask for preferential treatment. So in 2021, he applied for the construction of a three-room flat in the neighbourhood of Lositsa-7. But he received a refusal. In an official letter, the deputy head of the Central District Administration explains that a three-room flat is not provided for a family of two people, given the shortage of housing construction in Minsk. Nevertheless, this does not stop Korol, and to get the desired "three-room apartment" in a new house, he uses his connections. He appeals also to the then Minister of Education Igor Karpenko to send a letter on his behalf with a request, as they say, "to the very top". Here is one of the versions of this letter addressed to Alexander Lukashenko, in which the Korol cites political purges at the university among his achievements. BSU has a consistent personnel policy. It is aimed at employing only persons who fully share the ideology of the Belarusian state. The educational influence of the legal nature on the collective of students is carried out. 96 students who organised and participated in protest actions and events were expelled. Disciplinary penalties were imposed on 166 students, and 288 explanatory notes were taken. Rector's Mistresses And Admirers One can only guess why the rector of pre-retirement age without children needed a three-room flat in Minsk so badly. Especially, since the relationship with his wife leaves much to be desired. Judging by the correspondence in Viber, the rector had at least 7 admirers and mistresses in the last 4 years. Their names and photos are presented below. Some of Andrei Korol's mistresses are graduates or former employees of BSU. For some of them the relationship at the workplace happened at the same time. The women did not know about each other, but some of them complained about the rector's lack of attention and time for them. Andrei Korol has the closest relationship with former BSU graduate Ekaterina Bushmanova, who graduated from the university in 2018 with a degree in Modern Foreign Languages (teaching). Ekaterina is married to Ukrainian citizen Viktor Bushmanov and is a mother of triplets. She is also well acquainted with the Korol's wife. Their families even periodically spend time together. Which does not prevent the couple from cheating on their spouses far from the first year. Secret correspondence lovers conduct in a joint document through the service Dropbox. Below are fragments of this correspondence. In correspondence with mistresses and admirers, Korol often touches on the topic of politics. He chooses like-minded women who also support Russia's war in Ukraine. Below is a fragment of correspondence with Ekaterina Patrinina, who lives in Russia. Korol periodically sees her during his trips to Russia. We felt it our duty to dwell on these personal topics, as they partly reveal the duplicitous and deceitful character of Andrey Korol. He not only deceives his wife but also hides his mistresses from each other. Although some even introduce each other, for example, Ekaterina Patrinina once at the request of the Korol helped Ekaterina Bushmanova to get to an elite Moscow clinic, when she had serious complications with her kidneys in the period before childbirth. We consider it our duty to reveal the BSU rector's personal secrets, because after our attack on the university's internal network in the summer of 2023, political repressions within the university continued. The rector did not draw the proper conclusions, and continued to personally participate in political purges. It is also a clear warning for other managers and officials of the regime facilities who support the dictatorship. You think it's easy to write off our break-in as an "inside job" and get away with it? Continue breaking people's lives as if nothing had happened? Don't get your hopes up. Cyber partisans are not only about hacking and cyberattacks. We also do intelligence and data analytics. We know what you talk about with your lovers and spouses, how you spend your free time, how you berate your coworkers and superiors, how you try to cheat for personal gain for the regime you serve. And if you commit crimes against the Belarusan people, don't expect your secrets to remain secrets. Sabotage of questionnaires from Lukashenko's administration at BSU Andrey Korol not only asks for preferential treatment from his superiors allegedly for ideologically faithful service but also does not miss a chance to deceive the system he works for if it is profitable for him. The story with the questionnaire launched on the initiative of Lukashenka's administration is so indicative. In July 2023, the BSU rector received an order to conduct a survey among the teachers of the university, including the assessment of his work. However, Andrey Korol was not satisfied with the survey questions and perceived it as an attempt to provide grounds for his dismissal, which was already actively rumoured in the university environment at that time. On one of the computers on the BSU intranet, we found saved audio recordings that were probably left on the voicemail of one of the employees and saved to compromise colleagues. The collection of dozens of audio recordings sheds much light on the "inner kitchen" of university management. Thanks to these recordings, in the video part of the investigation we revealed in detail how Andrey Korol decided to sabotage the questionnaire and conduct the survey only among the teachers who support him. Thus, Lukashenko's administration got only those results that were convenient for the rector of the university. When vote rigging is the norm for officials in the country, such a situation is not surprising. Andrey Korol is just acting according to the proven scheme of the regime, which he supports. “Purges” Among Their Own BSU rector sent the results of the survey to Lukashenko's administration, according to which more than 78% of teachers are satisfied with the relationship with the university administration, while more than 90% of employees are satisfied with the moral and psychological climate. However, in the video part of the investigation, we published audio recordings, which shed light on a completely different situation at the university, including among the supporters of the dictator. Thus, Anna Bakun - vice-rector for educational work and social issues - shared her complaints about disrespect to her and negligent, in her opinion, attitude to work issues among her colleagues. We have also published an audio recording, in which she tells how the Lukashenko administration decided to get rid of her at BSU by an unspoken order and to do it in the same way as she does with students - through pressure and manipulation. Since 2020 Anna Bakun has been actively involved in political repression against BSU students. Among other things, she took part in the so-called "councils on prevention of offences", where students were intimidated from leaving the BRSM and participating in protests. However, 3 years later these "merits" have already been forgotten, and Lukashenka's administration decided to get rid of Bakun. Rector Andrey Korol plans to fire the deputy head of the department for educational work Yegor Podoliak, who publicly supports the dictatorial regime, so he can't be easily dismissed for political reasons, according to the same principle. We published an audio recording, where the BSU rector himself talks about his idea, in the video part of the investigation. On it, Korol shares how he plans to give Podolyak a task he can't cope with so that there would be a reason for dismissal. We have also published recordings in which the BSU rector speaks unflatteringly about Yevgeny Haruka — head of the department of expert and analytical work, who previously spied for him on students and teachers, including in protest groups, and then asked for a raise and thought about changing jobs. Andrei Korol calls Haruk a "scoundrel", " a louse", "bastard", "and scatty", and shares plans that he is going to publicly discredit him in front of the leaders of BISR (Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies) so that he would not be hired in the new structure. In addition, he accuses his subordinate of possibly leaking information about the BSU problem areas to Lukashenka's administration. By the way, in December 2023, the BSU received a request from Lukashenko's administration to dismiss Yevgeny Haruk so that he could take the position of the head of the department of internal political analysis at the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (abbreviated as BISR). However, in order to make sure that the employee would not be hired by the state structures, the rector made sure to have a bad characteristic against Haruk. In the video part of the investigation, we also published other recordings, where Andrei Korol: says that he intends to collect dirt on the dean of the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics, Sergei Bosyakov, who participated in political repression at BSU, so he can't be simply dismissed on policy grounds. tries to organise surveillance of deans after hours with the help of special services. openly insults other BSU employees. The rector is not shy about his colleagues: "asshole," "slut," "louse" are just a few examples of the characterizations he applies to people who work with him. In addition, we also provided an audio recording in which the KGB officer Yaroslav Cherkassky (who holds the position of vice-rector for security and personnel at BSU), tells how the Minister of Education apologised to his KGB supervisor for allowing Pavel Bychkovsky, the chief specialist for scientific and scientific-innovation activities of the enterprise "Unitekhprom BSU", into the expert council. At the same time, new appointments at the university to replace dismissed or resigned staff sometimes cause at least some confusion. In February 2023, for example, Alexei Belyaev was appointed dean of the journalism faculty by order of the rector. But just a few days later, an official complaint was sent to Andrei Korol from the faculty, stating that the new employee has nothing to do with journalism, either by education or labour activity. The authors of the complaint allege that Belyaev embezzled other people's work to obtain a position. By the way, Alexei Belyaev is still the dean of the Faculty of Journalism. The BSU administration did not pay attention to the collective complaints of the teachers. It doesn't matter that Belyaev has appropriated other people's works, but he writes a column in the ideologically correct newspaper "Sovetskaya Belorussia" and is a member of the pro-governmental party "Belaya Rus". With such a norm of relations in the team, it is not surprising that in 2023 there were reasonable rumours that Andrey Korol will be removed from the post of BSU rector. He suspected the current Minister of Education Andrei Ivants of this initiative, which he did not fail to complain about in messages via Vyber to Natalia Kochanova. Let's Summarize The situation with mass political dismissals and behind-the-scenes intrigues that have developed at the Belarusian State University is, unfortunately, just an example of what the whole education system has become under dictator Lukashenko. When educational institutions are turned into regime facilities with constant surveillance, denunciations to the KGB and authorities, and mass political dismissals. The Сyberpartisans felt it was their duty to show the true face of this system and make its secrets public. After we attacked the BSU internal network and the publication of some data from there in July 2023, the university administration issued a denial, citing a sudden technical failure. The unfortunate idea belongs to the head of the BSU Information Technology Centre, Viktor Kochin. The same stance will likely be taken by the university administration with regard to the current investigations. Publishing personal information and secret machinations of the BSU management was a consequence of the fact that instead of educational and scientific activities the university continues to engage in political purges. We remind you that any structure, enterprise or organisation that commits crimes against the Belarusian people in support of dictator Lukashenko becomes a legitimate target for Cyberpartisan attacks. Subscribe to the Cyberpartisan channel in Telegram to learn about new cyberattacks and investigations!

Belarusian Cyber Partisans The Belarusian Cyber Partisans is a highly organized hacktivist collective that is fighting for the liberation of Belarus from dictatorial rule, the establishment of democratic rights and the rule of law in the country. The group emerged in the aftermath of the 2020 protests in Belarus against the tyrant Lukashenko, who had unlawfully taken control of the country. There are no professional hackers among us; most participants are ordinary IT specialists who are unwilling to tolerate lawlessness and are committed to combating dictatorship in any feasible way. All members of the group remain anonymous since otherwise they and their families will be subject to persecution by Lukashenko’s regime. The only non-anonymous participant and official representative of the group is Yuliana Shemetovets. Yuliana graduated from the Belarusian State University in 2016 with a degree in World Economics from the Faculty of International Relations. She also holds a Master's degree in Political Science from Rutgers University, New Jersey, and a Data Analytics from the University of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA. Yuliana joined the Cyber Partisan group in August 2021 after a successful attack on the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus. Our principles The Belarusian Cyber Partisans is a group of activists who, under conditions of severe political repression in Belarus, have chosen the only possible form of civil protest and resistance: challenging the institutions of Lukashenko's regime through online means. We are unequivocally a group of hacktivists, not a hacking organization, bringing together professionals from various fields without any commercial objectives. We do not conduct attacks that could endanger people's health and safety. Our targets are solely entities that support the dictatorial regime. We do not carry out commercial orders. Our group works to overthrow the dictatorship in Belarus, and not for personal enrichment. We do not use the obtained information for personal gain. Only for solving crimes and countering dictatorial regimes in Belarus and Russia. We take care of the personal data of Belarusian citizens, and we make every effort to protect their personal data. We only reveal information that is related to the regime and people who committed crimes against Belarusian citizens. Our operations As our fight persists, we are unable to discuss the majority of our hacks, access to sensitive systems, and data that we have. Among the publicized operations, the most remarkable ones include: September 26, 2020 Hacking of state-run news websites The group hacked the transmissions of Belarus' state channels (ONT and Belarus-1), which regularly disseminated content in favor of the Lukashenko regime. They broadcasted videos featuring scenes of torture inflicted on individuals detained by Interior Ministry officers during peaceful protests in August 2020. July 26-30, 2021 The beginning of Operation Heat Hacking of numerous state databases of Belarus, including the traffic police database, the AIS Passport system, the database recording citizens' appeals to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the operational drone video recordings service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, among others. August 9, 2021 Hacking of the servers of the Department of Operational and Investigative Activity Provision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus The group successfully infiltrated the database of the Department of Operational and Investigative Activity Provision under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus. Consequently, we obtained terabytes of phone conversation records of Belarusian citizens, unveiling extensive surveillance orchestrated by entities controlled by the dictator Lukashenko. August 29, 2021 Hacking of phone databases of all operators in Belarus The group hacked databases containing details of all mobile numbers in Belarus September 2, 2021 Hacking of Unified State Register of Real Estat databases The Unified State Register of Real Estate was hacked. The group gained access to information about all real estate in Belarus. November 1, 2021 Hacking of the Social Security Fund database The National Social Security Fund was hacked. The group obtained access to records concerning official employment in Belarus and the corresponding salary information. November 8, 2021 Hacking of the Passenger Trafic Database November 17, 2021 The beginning of Operation Heat. The group obtained access to information about all individuals who crossed the border of Belarus through official checkpoints. Hacking of the internal network of the Academy of Public Administration of Belarus (so-called Lukashenko’s personal school). November 29, 2021 Cyberattack on the computer network of Belaruskali, one of the largest state-owned companies of Belarus. It used to be one of the largest producers of potash fertilizers in the world. We encrypted the computers and servers of the academy. We set wallpapers on the computers in honor of Roman Bondarenko - a Belarusian who was killed by employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs after a peaceful protest in the yard of his own home. November 30, 2021 Hacking of the wiretapped conversations within prison cells in Belarus Obtained recordings of conversations from prisoners in Belarus, which were illegally created by prison staff. December 10, 2021 Cyberattack on the computer network of "MogilevTransMash", the largest car company in Belarus The internal network of the enterprise was encrypted, all databases were downloaded. Wallpapers in honor of Andrey Zeltser, a protester killed by KGB employees, were installed on the computers of the staff. January 24, 2022 Cyberattack on the computer network of the Belarusian Railway The primary part of servers, databases, and workstations was encrypted to slow down and disrupt the operations of the Belarusian Railway, through which Russian occupation forces were permitted. Backups were destroyed. Automation and security systems were intentionally NOT affected by the cyberattack to prevent emergency situations. February 27, 2022 Attack on communication nodes and gateways of the Belarusian Railway Restriction on the movement of Russian military equipment through the territory of Belarus towards the borders of Ukraine. November 18, 2022 Cyberattack on the General Radio Frequency Centre, a subdivision of Roskomnadzor We encrypted workstations and extracted over 2 TB of data, which was then passed on to journalists from independent media. This exposure led to the revelation of extensive surveillance by Roskomnadzor of individuals who don't support the Kremlin's policies. May 22, 2023 Cyberattack on "WAGON-SERVICE", Russian logistic company "WAGON-SERVICE" logistics company maintains trains for Russian Railways, which in turn supplies military equipment and ammunition to the front. Workstations were encrypted. All document flow, emails, and data from servers (over 2 TB) were extracted. July 4, 2023 Cyberattack on the Belarusian State University The university's administration is involved in the political suppression of both students and faculty members. Workstations have been encrypted, and more than 3 terabytes of data have been downloaded. All websites were inaccessible. December 31, 2023 Attack on the Belarusian Telegraphic Agency The computer network of the main state propagandists of Lukashenko's criminal regime was attacked. Internal network and main sites hacked. (web archive available here ). Domain controllers affected. Downloaded 90GB of data. Cleared workstations, archives, backups, website servers. April 17, 2024 Cyber Attack on "Grodno Azot" "Grodno Azot" is one of the largest enterprises in Belarus. It's an open joint-stock company, state-run producer of nitrogen compounds and fertilizers. The management of "Grodno Azot" is engaged in political repression against workers and circumvents economic sanctions imposed by Western countries for supporting the Lukashenko regime. Internal emails, document circulation, and hundreds of workstations have been encrypted. Backups of databases, servers, emails, and document circulation have been destroyed. Security systems and surveillance cameras have been breached. The operation of the boiler room has been disrupted. The official website has been targeted (web archive accessible via link ). April 26, 2024 Breach of Belarusian KGB Website We announced that the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) website was hacked in the fall of 2023. The database of the website has been made public, which includes approximately 40 thousand inquiries to the KGB from citizens of various countries between September 2014 and August 2023. May 5, 2024 Second Cyber-Attack on Grodno Azot The management of the Grodno Azot plant engages in political repression against workers and circumvents economic sanctions imposed by Western countries for supporting the Lukashenko regime. Our group has erased data from many hundreds of worker computers, cleared document circulation, and affected domain controllers and other servers. Since December 2022, the Cyber Partisans have joined forces with the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment , which is fighting in Ukraine as one of the units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We engage in cyber offensives targeting adversary infrastructure, performing cyber intelligence, and ensuring cybersecurity.

How to Become a Cyber Partisan We welcome volunteers who share the primary goals and principles of the Cyber Partisan group. Having free time is crucial. You can be a professional specialist, but you won't help the group if you only devote a couple of hours a month to the tasks. No prior experience in IT? No problem. Our group comprises individuals with various specialties such as designers, video editors, managers, and more. There are tasks suitable for anyone who's proactive. Not a citizen of Belarus? No issue. We welcome individuals from various countries , as long as they have the enthusiasm to help us accomplish our objectives. We are looking for volunteers! Even if you lack expertise in the listed specialties, you can join us and aid in testing security applications such as P-Telegram and P-SMS. You don't need IT knowledge , just free time, attentiveness and willingness to help. Any form of participation will bring us closer to victory over dictatorship! Long Live Belarus ❤️ 🔹 Pentester: Penetration Testing & Cybersecurity Software 🔹 System Administrator 🔹 Network Engineer 🔹 Desktop Developers C++ (Windows/Linux/Mac) 🔹 Android Developers (Java) 🔹 Video Editor & Designer 🔹 Grant Writing manager / Grant Writer (IT) How to join 01 Reach out to the Telegram bot @cpartisans_join_bot or email cyberpartisans@protonmail.com with the following details: - How you can help. - Your skills and experience. 02 Do NOT block the bot and anticipate a response. Due to the workload of our administrators, the answer may not be immediately, please wait a while. 03 We will reach out to you as soon as possible.

Contacts Telegram Channels @cpartisans_by — provides the most current information about hacks, major leaks, and important events for the group. @cpartisans_dumps — focuses on data leaks and cyber investigations. @cpartisans_security — offers information on our app updates and shares useful security tips. Telegram Chatbots @cpartisans_bot — our primary anonymous bot. @cpartisans_urgent_bot — urgent bot (only for media, hackers, and assistance with access to regime systems). @partisan_qa_bot — bot for those interested in helping us test P-Telegram on Android, iOS, PC, P-SMS, and more. @cpartisans_join_bot — bot for those interested in joining our team. @partisan_telegram_bot — bot to address questions and report bugs related to P-Telegram and P-SMS applications. E-mail cyberpartisans@protonmail.com Twitter twitter.com/cpartisans Youtube www.youtube.com/c/cpartisans How To Help the Belarusian Cyber Partisans We are an organization run by volunteers, and our operations are primarily sustained through the generous donations of those who support our fight against dictatorship. You can contribute any amount to assist us. Transfer From a Bank Card 5354 5670 1711 0254 Partizan Wave (do not transfer from Belarusian banks ❗️) Support on Patreon Instructions for safe donations via Patreon Make a Bank Transfer Fundacja Białoruś Liberty (Foundation Belarus Liberty) z siedzibą w Warszawie, przy ul. Al. Jana Pawła II 43A/37B, 01-001 Warszawa NIP: 5213996842 REGON: 523918575 Help With Cryptocurrency BTC - bc1qprsr2escj8csq93qha9hdxperuj4aexlnzj5hu TRX - THpabeV9rTasBZzT8dCiv6AWoKErbYCqbz ETH - 0x6bE4E40E2778F46546639Eb2Ac47F94F89157AbC USDT (ETH) - 0x6bE4E40E2778F46546639Eb2Ac47F94F89157AbC XMR - 44aWk8qQKhkEhWdzQnnDctetNtTz51nEk4Xd4efaTUTg3LUTfvPQZz9VpprEeE2MbmGSU3zu4BaUXgafgsL5RhksCSd6dW5 Instructions for secure donations from a bank card to a cryptocurrency wallet in Belarus and Russia ❗️ PL 65 1140 2004 0000 3002 8357 3067 mBank S.A. ul. Prosta 18 00-850 Warszawa KOD SWIFT/BIC: BREXPLPWMBK Do not transfer from Belarusian banks ❗ What are the goals of the Cyber Partisans? To overthow the dictatorship regime of Lukashenko. To preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Belarus. To stabilize Belarus during the transition period, returning to democratic principles of governance and rule of law. How do the Cyber Partisans choose targets for attacks? Attacks are intended to minimize harm to ordinary citizens and maximize to regime's people. Targets are selected in a manner that genuinely damages dictaroship regimes or acquires important information that aids in causing such damage. We do not operate on systems unrelated to dictatorship regimes. We work within our means. Not all networks can be accessed. However, the more people and resources we have, the broader the range of targets available to us. Within the group, we define a common strategy. Periodically, we gather and prioritize goals based on the current political climate. Our hacktivists then work in line with the approved strategy. Can one order a cyberattack, hack, or information search from you? We do not accept commercial orders. All targets for attacks are chosen in a way that brings us closer to achieving the organization's main goals. How do you assist journalists? Thanks to hacks on structures supporting the dictators Lukashenko and Putin, the Cyber Partisans have obtained a vast amount of databases and documents. This information sheds light on the crimes of dictatorship regimes in Belarus and Russia. All data, which do not compromise the confidentiality and safety of ordinary citizens, are handed over upon request for journalistic investigations. Is it safe to install Partisan Telegram for communication? Partisan Telegram has undergone an independent security audit. Moreover, the application offers the maximum possible settings to disguise itself as the original Telegram. For activists' safety, we have also implemented a passwordless mode feature. If this option is activated, the application does not prompt for the code-password, which could raise suspicion among law enforcement and intelligence personnel. However, Partisan Telegram can be identified through a detailed forensic analysis of the device. We recommend considering this before installing the application. Do the Cyber Partisans provide paid services? All organizations, activists, and individuals adhering to democratic principles can expect our free assistance that aligns with our principles. However, due to our limited resources, immediate and/or long-term information-providing services are only available on a paid basis. For the details and contacts, please refer to the 'Contacts and Donations' section. What financial resources does the group have? The primary source of funds is financial assistance from private donors who care about the fate of Belarus. Any assistance is valuable and propels us toward achieving our main goals. What assistance will be most effective for Cyber Partisans? As a non-commercial volunteer organization, the best assistance for us would be donations of any amount acceptable to you. Funds are needed to support servers with databases, feedback bots, equipment, and the work of specialists. See the details in the 'Contacts and Donations' section. You can also make a significant contribution by joining our volunteer team. To do this, write to our bot @cpartisans_join_bot.