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- How Many Casualties Has Russia Sustained in the War with Ukraine?
Based on data from Rosstat, the Cyberpartisans have calculated the number of Russian fatalities in the war with Ukraine from 2022 through August 27, 2026. This figure includes only those deaths where the official cause was explicitly listed as military or combat operations. ❗️ 393,881 Russian Federation casualties in the war with Ukraine between 2022 and August 2026. 377179 — cause of death code Y.36 ‘Hostilities’ AND/OR Y89.1 ‘Consequences of hostilities’ according to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) in any of the 13 code fields of the mortality database. 6334 — the mortality database fields contain a verbal record of death as a result of military/combat operations without specifying the ICD-10 code Y.36/Y89/1. 10368 — the mortality database contains both the cause of death code Y.36/Y89/1 and a verbal record of death as a result of military/combat operations. Calculation methodology From the central register of deaths compiled by Rosstat, we selected individuals with the following entries in their death certificates: Y36 — Military operations;; Y89.1 — Consequences of military operations; Some records include verbal entries regarding deaths due to military or combat operations without specifying cause Y36 or Y89.1 according to the ICD-10 classification. Thus, the figure of nearly 394,000 deaths represents the minimum number of confirmed fatalities resulting from combat operations ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE ONLY. An extract from Rosstat’s database of deceased persons, containing records of those killed in the war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine from 2022 to 2026. Rosstat’s statistics on deaths do not include those missing in action unless they have been declared dead. The statistics may include a relatively small percentage of non-military Russian citizens who died as a result of military operations, as well as those who died in other wars during the period under review. A small percentage of combat deaths may have been omitted due to clerical errors made by statistics staff when recording the cause of death or medical codes. The count excludes those who died in the war but, for reasons unknown to us, were not included in the register, were recorded without a specified cause of death, or were recorded with an incorrect cause. It is also important to distinguish between confirmed fatalities and total personnel losses, which include those killed, wounded, disabled, or missing in action. We have calculated the number of confirmed fatalities separately. The total number of personnel losses in military conflicts is, as a rule, 3–5 times greater than the number of confirmed fatalities. Thus, our findings align with the figures on Russian military losses published by Ukrainian authorities. Other independent estimates of Russian Federation fatalities in the war with Ukraine Our colleagues at Silent Crow have also published their own tally of Russian Federation fatalities in the war with Ukraine. The figures differ slightly due to different calculation methods. They have described their approach on their channel. We also provide journalists from various media outlets with the database on the mortality of Russian citizens, sourced from Rosstat’s networks, in its raw form. Other independent estimates are therefore likely to emerge soon. ❗️Thanks to data from the Lukashenko regime’s databases, we are also able to calculate the number of Belarusian citizens who fought on the Russian side and were killed between 2022 and 2024. Keep an eye on our channel for updates!
- ROSSTAT’S STATISTICS — WHAT WAS ONCE HIDDEN IS NOW OUT IN THE OPEN
Since 2022, more and more statistics have been disappearing from public access in the Russian Federation. This includes not only data on mortality, but also on migration, disability, oil production, exports and imports of specific goods, and so on. They are hiding everything that could in any way reveal the Kremlin’s failures. Now, thanks to a hack of Rosstat, we will be able to shed light on many of the secrets of Putin’s regime. Rosstat officials keep making the same mistake as Roskomnadzor and Aeroflot after our attacks: they assert that no data breach has occurred. Let’s assist Rosstat in acknowledging the breach.😏 A Leak From Rosstat Within six months, my colleagues at Silent Crow and and we successfully accessed approximately 25,000 computers on Rosstat’s internal network, exfiltrating terabytes of data. This breach included the agency’s primary internal systems: DPSC, STATECH, Demography, and several others. Because agency employees use these platforms to store raw, unpublished statistical data, we were able to secure the full spectrum of their internal findings. Consequently, when discussing this significant leak, we are looking far beyond the personal data and internal documents of Rosstat employees—though we have already secured all of that information as well. Any attempt by Rosstat to deny the breach directly contradicts the reality faced by its own workforce. The most critical intelligence retrieved consists of highly confidential statistics that the Russian Federation has systematically concealed since 2022. This includes key demographic and socioeconomic indicators that reveal the true situation within Russia and the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Processing a dataset of this magnitude will take time. To ensure maximum efficiency, together with our colleagues at Silent Crow, we are prioritising the release of Rosstat’s internal document workflow to independent media journalists. This archive comprises over 3 TB of records, including those classified as "DSP" (Dlya Sluzhebnogo Polzovaniya — for official use only). Having analysed a preliminary portion of these files, we are providing initial examples of the insights contained within the dataset. Reports from the Occupied Territories of Ukraine Rosstat’s internal document workflow is a critical asset due to the comprehensive data it contains regarding Ukrainian territories currently under Russian occupation. The Putin regime meticulously suppresses this information; statistical data on these occupied regions is strictly withheld from the public and distributed only to authorised Russian federal agencies under the restrictive "DSP" (for official use only) classification. Consequently, these records provide an unprecedented, unvarnished look into the reality of life in these regions under occupation. A screenshot from an official letter to the heads of Rosstat’s regional offices (clickable). The document is attached below. Among the files are expert population estimates for the occupied territories spanning several years. This data is typically compiled in standalone spreadsheets distributed as attachments to official correspondence A screenshot of an electronic document containing data on the population of the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region (clickable). The document is attached below. An excerpt from a document detailing population figures for the occupied Donetsk region in 2023. The complete document is available for download below The archive also contains valuable, month-by-month production statistics spanning all economic sectors. For context, the document below details industrial and agricultural output in the occupied Donetsk region from January through December 2025. The archive includes comprehensive socioeconomic indicators across all tracking sectors, granularly broken down by month and specific reporting periods. It also features detailed payroll data — including average wages and headcount metrics — both on an aggregate level and isolated by industry. This data provides critical baseline material for researchers conducting economic impact assessments. Furthermore, the archive contains specialised datasets of significant value to niche researchers, including historical reporting on infectious disease rates within the occupied territories. We welcome inquiries from experts with an active research interest in these specific metrics. However, due to the heavy administrative workload involved in processing this data, we kindly request that you defer outreach for the next few months. We will be better positioned to accommodate data requests later in the year once our initial processing and analysis are complete. ROSSTAT’S STATISTICS: Broader Statistical Indicators Rosstat’s electronic document management system aggregates granular data from all territories under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, alongside comprehensive nationwide metrics. This repository holds significant value for researchers across a vast spectrum of fields. Crucially, a substantial portion of this data is withheld from the public domain under restricted classifications, making these internal documents and databases the sole source for this otherwise inaccessible information. An extract from a document containing data on Russian Federation exports for 2025, taken from Rosstat’s internal document management system (clickable). The full document can be downloaded and viewed below. However, the document workflow does not include the full range of statistics available to the department. Most of the unpublished information is contained in databases. Statistical reports on these hidden indicators were not prepared in a format suitable for publication, as they were deemed unnecessary. We still have to sift through these terabytes of ‘raw’ data to assess the scale of the leak in greater detail. This publication therefore focuses primarily on the document workflow, which is relatively easier to analyse. Data on Russian Federation casualties in the war against Ukraine One of our priorities on the Rosstat network was to extract statistics on actual mortality in the Russian Federation. Such data is not transmitted in full through the document workflow either, but is contained in a separate database within the Demography system. This is a database containing death certificates for absolutely all Russian citizens whose deaths have been officially recorded. We obtained data covering the period from the start of the full-scale war with Ukraine up to August 2026. As an example, we are publishing the death records for Yevgeny Prigozhin and Alexei Navalny from this database. Entry from Rosstat’s death register regarding the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin (clickable) Entry from Rosstat’s death register regarding the death of Alexei Navalny (clickable) While we have not yet identified a dedicated, standalone Rosstat dataset tracking casualties from the hostilities, the database does contain granular cause-of-death records that allow researchers to verify when an individual died specifically in the war. For context, we have included a screenshot of a June 2023 report from the Krasnoyarsk Region Statistics Office showing exactly how these deaths are documented. We are also publishing the complete unredacted file. Document Excerpt: Internal registry data on the deaths of Russian citizens from the Krasnoyarskstat system, June 2023. Click to enlarge. Download the complete file below. Consequently, calculating true casualty figures requires aggregating every record where the death certificate explicitly notes a fatality resulting from military hostilities. Our team has just begun this extensive data processing phase. So keep an eye on our channel for updates! How to contact us We are currently accepting applications from journalists from independent media organisations seeking access to Rosstat’s internal document management system, who are prepared to spend time analysing the available materials. To submit a request, please message us via the bot for media representatives: @cpartisans_urgent_bot ❗Please note that the bot is for media representatives only, and we are not currently accepting applications from members of the public. Concurrently, we are analysing the broader leaked Rosstat databases and will share updates regarding future data releases, collaborative investigations, and public disclosures. Stay tuned for updates on the CyberPartisans channel and website!
- CYBERATTACK ON ROSSTAT—THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL STATISTICAL SERVICE
Cyberpartisans, together with their colleagues at Silent Crow destroyed the heart of Rosstat, where all key data on Putin’s regime's socio-economic indicators converged. 🔥 We wiped out Rosstat’s IT infrastructure: databases, servers, virtualisation environment, document management systems, workstations, personal workstations, and VPNs. 🔥 We destroyed key systems including STATECH, DCPC, Demography, EDMS, ESSBO, ONS, employee wiretapping, Stateregister, Digital Analytical Platform, and others. 🔥 We obtained valuable data (including state-secret-classified information). The total volume of document management systems and databases downloaded exceeds 10 TB. 🔥 We posted official Ukrainian data regarding Russian losses in Ukraine on the Rosstat website. 😏 Cyberattack on Rosstat — Details Cyberpartisans, in collaboration with Silent Crow, infiltrated the network of the Russian Federation's Federal State Statistics Service approximately six months ago. Since then, a methodical effort was launched to secure access to all of Rosstat’s core systems—a process carried out slowly and cautiously over the course of 4 months. Rosstat Network Domain Controller After gaining access to the agency’s critical systems, we systematically exfiltrated vital data and internal documents. Our reach extended to massive storage repositories holding more than 5 PiB of data (1PiB = 1024TiB). Once we had firmly established our foothold in the network and gathered the most critical intelligence, we teamed up with our colleagues a month ago to plan the strike. The operation peaked in intensity over the past two weeks. The cyberattack on Rosstat itself, which dismantled its entire critical IT infrastructure, began overnight between October 31 and November 1. The most devastating phase of the attack targeted the agency’s internal network, destroying both virtual and physical servers alongside mass data storage systems. Recovery will demand a significant amount of time and resources from the Putin regime. A message to all Rosstat employees who support the Russian regime! The compromised “hypervisor” is a server running the “domestic” virtualisation software zVirt. Deletion of Rosstat’s 1,800 TB mass storage. As a bonus, we also published official Ukrainian statistics on Russian war losses directly on the Rosstat website. The data managed to stay online for about an hour. Shortly after, everything within Rosstat’s internal network began crashing, taking the public website down with it 😊. While the site remains completely unavailable, you can still view the archived page at this link: Web archive. We should note that Rosstat’s defenses were significantly more robust than those of Aeroflot, which we targeted in 2025. They had even made a concerted effort to defend themselves specifically against us. As an example, here is one of the internal documents we uncovered on their network. Measures to prevent information security threats associated with the activities of the GOFFEE and Cyber Partisans hacker groups. :) Nevertheless, the measures taken did not save them.. :) What data was obtained The vast array of information extracted from Rosstat’s internal network consists of socioeconomic and demographic indicators. Among them are classified statistics on actual mortality in the Russian Federation, including causes of death (a total of over 1 TB of data). In addition, there are classified statistics on the occupied Ukrainian territories. We also downloaded the document management system (over 3 TB of documents, including those classified as “DSP” - For Official Use Only). An example of a document or official use only from Rosstat’s document management system. The total volume of documents and databases we’ve obtained exceeds 10 TB. We’ll soon publish a detailed post showcasing some of the data we’ve obtained. Independent journalists and investigators will be able to assess what kind of information they can request from us. Stay tuned for updates! ✊ Support Cyber Partisans.
- ❗️CYBERATTACK ON KHIMVOLOKNO
We struck the computer network of Khimvolokno, the largest supplier of nylon yarn in Russia — the material used to make the lining for helmets and body armor for the Russian army. 👊💥 Cyberattack on Khimvolokno — Details We targeted Khimvolokno as part of our campaign against the Lukashenko regime. The plant routinely circumvents EU sanctions and supplies technical polyamide yarn to Russia , where manufacturers use it to produce military-grade fabrics, including body armor and combat helmets. Several former employees of Khimvolokno and its parent company, Grodno Azot, are currently political prisoners under the Lukashenko regime. We launched the operation on February 24, the anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The cyberoperation lasted about 24 hours. During that time, we moved freely through the company’s network and gained full domain administrator privileges. Domain controller of the Khimvolokno corporate network On the night of February 25–26, we breached the most secure segment of the IT infrastructure — the data center. We destroyed all eight physical servers, along with dozens of critical virtual machines running on them. Khimvolokno data center — security camera footage We disabled domain controllers, servers, virtual machines, and workstations. Some devices now carry “cyber time bombs.” In total, we gained access to roughly 1,000 machines, including servers involved in core production processes. Khimvolokno’s employees can now prepare for forced leave. Office operations, accounting, marketing and sales, shipping, as well as technical and administrative processes have all been disrupted. Extracting marketing and sanctions-evasion supply data from Khimvolokno’s network We took down ERP systems and databases, corporate email, the Directum document management system, backup systems, and more. Recovery will take weeks, and some data is gone for good. Permanent deletion of large-scale data storage systems We also compromised the security and video surveillance systems, which allowed us to monitor Khimvolokno’s operations in real time. We watched employees pull servers out and attempt to “resuscitate” them. Khimvolokno employees attempt to “resuscitate” the data center — security camera footage We are publishing excerpts from the facility’s security cameras, including footage from production areas, offices, corridors, and entry checkpoints. Surveillance footage shows that Khimvolokno’s warehouses are severely overstocked — typically a sign of serious sales problems. Security camera footage from the Khimvolokno facility Security camera footage from the Khimvolokno facility The Lukashenko regime has halted the release of political prisoners and continues to support Putin’s war. If it wants to avoid further cyber sanctions, it must resume releasing hostages and stop aiding the Russian war machine.
- P-Telegram Without Passcode Lock
When security services or law enforcement officers see a passcode prompt on the Telegram login screen, they often suspect that the app is P-Telegram. To reduce suspicion, we introduced a passwordless mode. How it works 1️⃣ Enable the feature: Passcode Lock Menu → Choose the Fake Passcode → Passwordless Mode. 2️⃣ Enter your Fake Passcode when opening Telegram. 3️⃣ The app applies all Fake Passcode settings and will NO longer display the passcode screen on startup. 4️⃣ To restore the original setup, type your Real Passcode into the search bar and tap the back arrow. Who may find this useful Anyone who hides channels, chats, or accounts and wants to avoid drawing attention during an inspection. You can keep P-Telegram in decoy mode at all times and enter your real passcode only when you want to access political chats or channels. 🎥 Watch the video attached to the post for detailed instructions. Please share this post so more people learn about the new feature. Stay safe 🙏
- Accidental Tap Protection in Partisan Telegram
Worried about accidentally subscribing to a channel or reacting to a comment? Turn on the Accidental Tap Protection feature. Once enabled, the app will ask you to confirm actions such as: Opening links outside Telegram Joining chats or channels Reacting to messages (excluding channel posts) Posting comments in chats and channels ⚙️ How to enable Settings → Privacy and Security → Passcode Lock → Partisan Settings → Protection against accidental clicks (Enable)
- Partisan Telegram — Voice Changer Feature
Starting with version 4.3.0, Partisan Telegram includes a voice-changing option for calls and audio/video recordings. The feature is turned off by default. Here’s how to enable and use it. 📕 You can find answers to most common questions in the user guide . ⚠️ Please note: modifying your voice does not guarantee anonymity. Technical methods may still allow voice identification. Use this feature thoughtfully and with caution. Download Partisan Telegram disguised as the web version. Download Partisan Telegram disguised as the Google Play version. 🐞 To report bugs, contact the support bot @partisan_telegram_bot ✊ Support the project (BTC) - bc1qw4yqlzgjxnl9dtzchxj7nkjdlw6uz2gdkp0679
- One-Tap Deletion of All Your Messages in P-Telegram
In P-Telegram (Partisan Telegram) , you don’t have to scroll through chats and delete messages one by one. You can remove all of your messages from a private or group chat with a single tap. Reminder: Clear your messages before leaving a group chat. Otherwise, they may remain available to other participants and could appear in exported account history. How to delete your messages with one tap in P-Telegram 1️⃣ Open the chat and tap the three dots in the corner of the screen. 2️⃣ Select Delete My Messages . 3️⃣ Tap Delete while keeping the Delete All My Messages option checked. Note: You can also delete messages selectively instead of removing everything. Uncheck Delete All My Messages , then enter the keywords or phrases from the messages you want to remove in the menu that appears.
- How to Hide Channels and Chats in Telegram from Prying Eyes
If you use Partisan Telegram by Cyber Partisans, you can rename any channel or chat however you like and disable its avatar. This helps protect your privacy in everyday situations — for example, on public transport. If someone glances at your screen, they’ll only see the custom name you chose, which reveals nothing about the channel’s real content. Just follow the steps below to hide channels and chats in Telegram (more precisely, in Partisan Telegram). ⚙️ How to Rename Channels and Chats 1️⃣ Open the channel or chat. 2️⃣ Tap the name at the top of the screen. 3️⃣ Tap the three dots and select Edit Chat Name . 4️⃣ Enter the new name and tap Save . To restore the original name, follow the same steps and select Delete . ⚙️ How to Disable the Avatar 1️⃣ Open the channel or chat. 2️⃣ Tap the name at the top of the screen. 3️⃣ Tap the three dots and select Disable Avatar . These changes are visible only in PTelegram on your device. If you enter the Fake Passcode, the app restores the original names and avatars.
- Self-Destructing Messages in PTelegram
These can come in handy when you need to share sensitive information and want to reduce the risk of data leaks. How to send Self-Destructing Messages in PTelegram Type the message you want to send → press and hold the send button → select Delete After Reading.
- How to Read Telegram Channels Without Subscribing
Partisan Telegram includes a section called “Saved Channels.” It lets you add channels so you can keep them within easy reach — even if you’re not subscribed to them. How to add a channel to Saved Channels: Open the channel → tap the three vertical dots → Save How to read saved Telegram channels: Tap the menu button (three horizontal lines) → Saved Channels How to remove a channel from the saved list: Saved Channels → press and hold the channel name → tap the trash icon How to disable Saved Channels from the menu: Settings → Privacy and Security → Passcode Lock → Partisan Settings → Saved Channels → Disable After you enter the Fake Passcode, the Saved Channels section hides automatically from the menu, as the messenger switches to its original Telegram disguise.
- Secret Group Chats in Partisan Telegram
For highly confidential conversations in Telegram, secret chats usually offer the safest option. This special chat mode is available only in the mobile version of the messenger. In the original Telegram, secret chats work only between two people. In Partisan Telegram, we added the ability to create secret group chats. For more details on how this works: 📕 See the guide. Maximum of 10 participants The group creator can add or remove members and change the group name and avatar Any group member can enable message auto-deletion after reading Download the app disguised as the web version. Download the app disguised as the Google Play version. 🐞 To report bugs, contact the support bot @partisan_telegram_bot











